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5 of 6 found the following review helpful:
 Skip this one Feb 10, 2009
The author clearly has an axe to grind with Western civilization, and takes every opportunity to make mocking attacks against nineteenth century England and the United States. This is done, of course, while ignoring or discounting most of the egregious behavior of the natives. The author's attempts to craft this narrative, while fully ignoring the military utility of most of the decisions made by the Western leaders, does a disservice to all societies involved. A biased, slanted, and objectionable work overall, I would recommend reading material that makes more of an effort at objectivity in its analysis.
On a positive note, the premise is very original and makes an excellent argument for the links between these two battles. The book is well-researched and well-written, although flawed by an obvious bias.
3 of 3 found the following review helpful:
History Doesn't Repeat, It Stutters Feb 09, 2009
Whereas James Gump's, THE DUST ROSE LIKE SMOKE examined the similarity in the root causes of the two respective conflicts this book is essentially composed of intertwined historical narratives. As each progresses the author alludes to parallels in the other battle, some of which are superficial coincidences and others of which are more substantive. While hardly a polemic, THE DUST ROSE LIKE SMOKE took the long view and seemed influenced by Marxist modes of thought. This book is written in a slightly less academic, more accessible tone focusing on parallels in personalities, weapons and tactics.
Paul Williams writes quite clearly; this is a thoroughly enjoyable and often informative read. I would recommend it with the caveat that in some ways it turns too much on a comparison of Custer and Durnford. Without going into detail, it's worth noting that despite their flamboyant dress and being saddled with a significant share of the blame for losing the respective battles afterward, Custer was truly in command while Durnford (in my opinion) played the part of a despised subordinate far more comparable to Benteen. Likewise, I felt that on some occasions Williams was over reaching in his discussion of "generalship," liberally switching between operational and tactical decision making in the comparisons. Also, while it is true that both Chelmsford/Durnford and Terry/Custer divided their forces before a superior enemy, in the former case the Zulu attacked and in the latter the US Cavalry attacked. Finally worth mentioning is that the Little Big Horn was PRIMARILY a running cavalry (or at least a mounted infantry) fight, the British were stymied by a LACK of cavalry at Isandlwana. The author tends to gloss over some of this although he does point out in straightforward fashion that where Custer eschewed reinforcements, Durnford requested them.
In any case I suspect most readers will come to this book far better versed on one of the two debacles. I'm stronger on Isandlwana and so found the Custer narrative more compelling. But I think nearly every reader will discover something new on one side of the ledger or other, enjoying the tour in the process. Even if one entirely rejects the central thesis that the two battles were eerily alike, this is a thought provoking book and I profited from reading it.
3 of 3 found the following review helpful:
Well Done but Needs More Maps Jun 02, 2008
Years ago, I read James Gump's academic treatment of the Zulu War and the Great Sioux War, THE DUST ROSE LIKE SMOKE in which he compared the broad causes and consequences of these two similar wars against aborginal peoples. This book though gets at the most compelling aspects of these two wars, namely, their most famous battles--Little Big Horn (June 1876) and Islandhlwana (January 1879). Williams compares Custer and Durnford as people and commanders. He examines both battles by alternating back and forth between the two as they progress along similar lines--Reno's valley fight, the opening of the Islandhlwana engagement, the fate of Custer's column, the route of Durnford's command, the seige of Reno Hill compared to Rorke's Drift, etc. Both British and American commanders fully expected, with justifiable reasons, that their main problem would be simply catching their elusive foes and bringing them to battle. He points out some similar controversies--accusations that both Custer and Durnford disobeyed orders, the author coming down with a no (correctly) on these key questions. He readily admits that Durnford enjoys nowhere near Custer's fame and name recognition but the comparisons, nevertheless, work, right down to the fact that some of the Reno Court of Inquiry took place simulataneously with the British military court of inquiry conducted immediately after the January 22, 1879 Islandhlwana fight.
As a student of the Little Big Horn, the one map provided of that battle was more than adequate as I have a library full of maps in other books to draw on plus the ones "in my head." For Islandhlwana though, due to my relative lack of knowledge on the battle, the one provided proved insufficient as it can't document the various developments with the corresponding approximate times. Yes, one book on Islandhlwana is buried somewhere on my shelves but maps in the context of the book can't be beat.
Also, readers should note that this book is drawn from secondary sources and is without footnotes but all this is forgivable as it is an entertaining read and isn't striving to be the end-all book on these two battles. Instead, it entertains and enlightens.
7 of 8 found the following review helpful:
Review Oct 24, 2007
To me, this "read" is primarily a relatively straightforward xs and os analysis and comparison of the 1876 Little Bighorn fight and the 1879 Isandlwana/Rorke's Drift tussle (which, by the way, is perhaps one of the best known and most analyzed battles in the history of the British army).
As a longtime student of the Little Bighorn fight, I don't suppose that I really learned anything that I didn't already know about that incident, except for one thing: almost in passing, the author brought out one rather interesting (at least, to me) angle. What I am talking about may be found on page 204. According to the author, the hasty "Be quick. Bring packs" message was a communication with the intent of having Reno (not Custer) reinforced, whose success in keeping the warriors busy at the southern end of the village was vital to Custer's plan to attack from the flank somewhere a little further north. In the author's view, the "P.S. Bring pacs" emphasized that Reno was the one who urgently needed help (at least at the time). Maybe so, since Custer's troops were not even engaged yet. Also, by most accounts, he was aware that Reno was getting whipped. Further, as the author points out, almost in passing, the note made no mention of Custer's route or location, and Trumpeter Martini (the message carrier) was apparently given no orders to guide Benteen back to Custer's command. Benteen would later be criticized for not linking up with Custer and bringing along the packs with extra ammo as supposedly ordered, but author Williams claims that, in fact, Benteen did carry out his orders by going to Reno. The author notes that it is only in hindsight that many have assumed that the reinforcements and ammo were supposed to be for Custer. Maybe? Yet another mystery!
Otherwise, after reading about the blaming and cover-up that followed the Isandlwana fight, it is even easier to believe (unless one is incredibly naive) that living officers, with the tacit blessing of the army and other "powers that be", did what they could to protect reputations, careers, etc. by creating the impression that a brave but impetuous Custer had irresponsibly brought on the Little Bighorn debacle by disobeying orders.
6 of 10 found the following review helpful:
 Truth is stranger than fiction Jun 29, 2007
Having previously read books about the Little Bighorn, but not Isandlwana, I was fascinated to read this comparison of the two battles. The author reveals a repetition of history to a spooky degree. Not only the grand strategy for invading native lands, but both Custer and Durnford's hangups regarding previous mistakes, and the deployment of Major Reno and Captain Barton commands etc. Then the flight across the river, and the Reno/Rorke's Drift sieges etc. And then both Custer and Durnford being accused, after death, of disobeying their orders. It goes on and on. Having previously read John Gray's books about Custer, this book turns Gray's arguments about Benteen on their head. Why did Custer send no Indian scouts on the reconnaissance to the left? Why did he only send word to Benteen 50 minutes after he ordered Reno to attack? At the same time the writer seems to give a fair analysis of the `Last stand' or `no last stand' argument; a fascinating read.
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