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HomeShop at BookSurgeCurrent EventsGovernmentThe Commission on the Intelligence Capabilities of the United States Regarding Weapons of Mass Destruction: Report to the President of the United States |
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 A Remarkable Intelligence Resource... Apr 10, 2008
The 2005 Report of "The Commission on the Intelligence Capabilities of the United States Regarding Weapons of Mass Destruction" is a remarkably detailed resource document for intelligence professionals and for those in academia, the media, and government who monitor the intelligence community. It is the unclassified output of a bi-partisan group charged by the President with determining how the U.S. Intelligence Community collectively failed to accurately assess Iraqi WMD capabilities prior to the 2003 invasion by the U.S. and its allies.
The Commission answers its primary question in blunt detail. Simply put, the intelligence community based its assessment of Iraq on incomplete and sometimes inaccurate data, faulty assumptions, less than rigorous analysis, and less than imaginative collection. The intelligence community, having significantly underestimated Iraq's WMD capabilities prior to the first Gulf War in 1991, displayed a tendency to favor worst-case interpretations of the limited data available between 1991 and 2003. Their cause was not helped by a persistent and often successful effort by Saddam Hussein's regime to confuse and deny U.S. collection efforts, making Iraq an extremely hard target.
Through a comparision of intelligence efforts against Iraq with similar efforts against Libya, Afghanhistan, North Korea, and Iran, finds much to critique in how the Intelligence Community did business at that time. This critique takes the form of a series of recommendations for the reform of the U.S. intelligence community. These recommendations include designating a Director of National Intelligence and giving that individual the staff and authority to organize and integrate intelligence community activities in the form of collection, analysis, and coordination against the nation's most obvious opponents. Many of these recommendations have been subsequently implemented through legislation and executive order. The Commission report provides the detailed rationale for the reforms. The need for reform was not new; the failures of 9/11 and Iraq provided the necessary momentum for implementation.
The Commission report is nearly 700 pages of fairly dry reading,some of which has been summarized in media reports and in specialized accounts by intelligence community monitors such as Jeffrey Richelson. Nevertheless, the report provides fascinating insights into how the community does, or doesn't, do business. The report has no photgraphs, graphics or other presentations; the resizing of the text to fit the publication format has left behind an annoying number of hyphenated words.
This book is highly recommended as a resource document to intelligence professionals and those who monitor the intelligence community.
0 of 7 found the following review helpful:
 A Slam Dunk! Oct 29, 2005
Measure twice, cut once.
Perhaps we should examine the classic meaning of "Intelligence". Assess accurately then act prudently.
We will never have a perfect understanding of the capabilities of nations and actors that intend to do us great harm. We can learn from our mistakes and improve our intelligence gathering system.
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